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THE BIG CHILL: THIRD-PARTY DOCUMENTS
AND THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
Bradley S. Miller*
In the wake of Philip Morris' multi-billion dollar libel suit against
ABC, a Virginia court has sanctioned a new method of discovery
that promises to have an unsettling impact on the reporter's
privilege to protect confidential sources. In Philip Morris Cos. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., the tobacco giant moved to compel
disclosure of the identity of a former R.J. Reynolds manager who
suggested on ABC's Day One news program that tobacco compa-
nies add nicotine to the cigarettes they manufacture. At the same
time, Philip Morris issued subpoenas for the expense records of two
ABC employees who wrote and produced the story, in a novel effort
to discover the source's identity. In a preliminary order issued
before the parties settled, the judge hearing the case denied ABC's
motion to quash the subpoenas. This Note argues for an expansion
of the reporter's privilege to documents held by third parties.
Specifically, this Note first summarizes the reporter's privilege
under existing law and examines First Amendment justifications
for the reporter's privilege. This Note then surveys the present law
concerning discovery of third-party records and scrutinizes the
policy arguments both in favor of and against extending the
reporter's privilege to documents held by third parties. Finally, this
Note suggests an alternative analysis to that adopted by the
Virginia court when litigants seek discovery of third-party records
in libel actions.
INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 1994, Day One, an ABC newsmagazine,
launched a serious assault on the integrity of the tobacco
industry. With the burden of defending product liability
lawsuits and the prospect of new federal regulations on to-
bacco, the cigarette lobby found itself answering new charges
that its leading manufacturers "artificially add[] nicotine to
cigarettes to keep people smoking and boost profits."'
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume
29, 1995. B.A. 1993, University of Michigan; J.D. 1995, University of Michigan Law
School. Associate, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe.
1. Day One (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 28, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Script File (transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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Following the Day One broadcast, Philip Morris, the na-
tion's largest tobacco company, filed a $10 billion libel suit
against the network, reporter John Martin, and producer Walt
Bogdanich in Virginia Circuit Court.2 Much of the credibility
of ABC's report rested on a statement made by a former
manager of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco that the manufacturers add
nicotine to their product "to keep the consumer happy."3 The
manager, who would later become known only as "Deep
Cough," asked to be interviewed in silhouette to conceal her
identity.4 Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, and ABC eventually
settled the case in August 1995, with ABC agreeing to issue
an apology and to pay legal fees for Philip Morris and R.J.
Reynolds.5 The apology, which ran during the ABC World
News Tonight and Day One broadcasts, stated that ABC
"'should not have reported that Philip Morris and [R.J.]
Reynolds add significant amounts of nicotine from outside
sources.' "
Although the parties eventually settled, prior to settling,
they filed pre-trial motions and conducted discovery. During
discovery, Philip Morris issued subpoenas to third parties for
documents that would reveal the identity of "Deep Cough."7
The manager's identity was essential to Philip Morris' libel
case in several respects. First, to succeed in a libel case, Philip
Morris, as a public-figure plaintiff, would have needed to
demonstrate actual malice.' To do this, the tobacco company
would have been required to prove either that ABC knew that
the report was false or that the network acted with a reckless
disregard for the truth.9 The strength of Philip Morris' case,
therefore, depended on the credibility of Deep Cough. If ABC
had had any reason to know that the former R.J. Reynolds
2. Howard Kurtz, Philip Morris Sues ABC Over Reports on Nicotine, WASH.
POST, Mar. 25, 1994, at A2.
3. Day One, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Howard Kurtz, Long-Term Effect of ABC Settlement Concerns Critic, WASH.
POST, Aug. 23, 1995, at A4.
6. Id.; Mark Landler, Critic Pushes Tobacco Case Settled by ABC, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1995, at D8. At the same time, "the carefully worded apology said ABC
believed the primary focus of the story was correct." Gail Appleson, ABC Libel Pact
Bodes Ill for Journalism, Experts Say, REUTER BUS. REP., Aug. 22, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Busrpt File.
7. William Glaberson, A Libel Suit Raises Questions About the Ability of
Journalists to Protect Sources in the Electronic Age, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1994, at D6.
8. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
9. See id. at 280, 286.
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manager lied about the levels of nicotine in cigarettes, then
Philip Morris would have been in a stronger position to dem-
onstrate a reckless disregard for the truth. Without knowing
the identity of Deep Cough, however, Philip Morris would have
struggled to make a case for actual malice.
Second, by discovering the identity of Deep Cough, Philip
Morris could have brought a separate libel action. Although
the source may not have had deep pockets like ABC, winning
a libel judgment against a former R.J. Reynolds manager
would have helped to vindicate the tobacco manufacturer in
the eyes of government regulators concerned about the effects
of smoking.' °
As is typical in high-stakes libel cases, Philip Morris peti-
tioned the court to force ABC's Martin and Bogdanich to name
their confidential source." In a preliminary ruling, Judge T.J.
Markow granted the tobacco company's request to compel
disclosure of the former R.J. Reynolds employee's identity. 2 At
the same time, Judge Markow denied ABC's motion to quash
Philip Morris' subpoenas for third-party documents. 3
Philip Morris' effort to subpoena records from companies
such as American Express and AT&T' 4 to track the activities
of the journalists while they were researching the tobacco
industry is said to be the first move of its kind. 5 In a brief
submitted by ABC in support of its motion to quash, its law-
yers argued that allowing the subpoenas for the reporters'
10. Cf Kenen, supra note 2 (noting an increased public call for federal regulation
of nicotine as a drug and President Clinton's comment that he was "really bothered"
by ABC's report).
11. Glaberson, supra note 7, at D6.
12. Philip Morris Cos. v. American Broadcasting Cos., No. LX-816-3, slip op. at
13 (Richmond Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 26, 1995) [hereinafter Philip Morris (Jan. 26, 1995)1;
see also Mark Dillon, ABC Ordered to Identify 'Deep Cough' in $10 Billion Tobacco
Suit, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 28, 1995, at C6.
13. Philip Morris (Jan. 26, 1995), supra note 12, at 13. On July 11, 1995, Judge
Markow issued a decision vacating his earlier order compelling disclosure of ABC's
confidential source, finding that Philip Morris must "go further to convince the court
that its need for discovery of the confidential sources is compelling." Philip Morris
Cos. v. American Broadcasting Cos., No. LX-816-3, slip op. at 3 (Va. Cir. Ct. City of
Richmond July 11, 1995) [hereinafter Philip Morris (July 11, 1995)]. Judge Markow
evidently stood by his decision to deny ABC's motion to quash the third-party
subpoenas, however, stating at one point in the decision that he "assum[ed] ... that
discovery might obviate the need for confronting th[e] constitutional issue" of source
disclosure. Id.
14. Philip Morris also sought records from Citibank, USAir, United Airlines,
Continental Airlines, Hertz Corporation, Adam's Mark Hotel, Cellular One, Bell Atlantic,
MCI, Sprint, and NYNEX. Philip Morris (Jan. 26, 1995), supra note 12, at 2.
15. Glaberson, supra note 7, at D6.
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financial records would "trample" an important privilege
based on the First Amendment:
I6
In this modern world, reporters cannot gather news from
across the nation without making telephone calls, boarding
airplanes, renting cars, staying in hotels, and using credit
cards. A reporter's privilege that provides reliable protec-
tion only where reporters gather news on foot and by
word-of-mouth would be no privilege at all.
17
This Note analyzes the arguments for and against a libel
plaintiff's right to subpoena third-party documents. The
Philip Morris case may be one of first impression, but the
tactic of using third-party documents to discover the identity
of a confidential source is likely to be employed and chal-
lenged in future libel cases. Because a reporter's privilege to
protect a confidential source is defined differently in every
state, it could take years and multiple cases to establish the
law in this area.'" Although Philip Morris may provide a
glimpse of how courts will handle this issue, it is of limited
precedential value. This case, therefore, may be only the
beginning of what could be a long and arduous debate over
the reporter's privilege.
This Note will argue for an expansion of the reporter's
privilege to cover third-party documents. Part I will outline
the reporter's privilege under current law. Part II will provide
an overview of the traditional First Amendment justifications
for the reporter's privilege. Part III will analyze current law
on third-party discovery. Part IV will present a policy argu-
ment for extending the privilege to third-party documents.
Finally, Part V will propose a test to determine when to apply
an expanded privilege.
16. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order and
for Relief from Subpoenas Duces Tecum and Letters Rogatory at 3, Philip Morris Cos.
v. American Broadcasting Cos., No. LX-816-3 (Va. Cir. Ct. City of Richmond Nov. 8,
1994) [hereinafter ABC Memorandum].
17. Id.
18. See Paul L. Glenchur, Note, Source Disclosure in Public Figure Defamation
Actions: Toward Greater FirstAmendment Protection, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 636 (1982)
(suggesting that "(ci ourts deciding whether to order disclosure of a source in defama-
tion actions are provided with little judicial guidance").
616
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I. OUTLINE OF THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
The reporter's privilege typically focuses on the reporter's
right to refuse to disclose a source in court proceedings.' 9
Many jurisdictions, however, expand the privilege to cover
information gathered by a reporter in the course of writing
a story.2 ° Only one court has actually considered the effect of
the privilege on third-party documents-information not
gathered from a source but which nonetheless would have a
tendency to reveal the source's identity.2 '
A. The Reporter's Privilege and the First Amendment
Prior to 1958, American courts did not recognize the report-
er's privilege.22 In that year, lawyers for the New York Herald
Tribune made a constitutional argument for the recognition
of this privilege. 23 Garland v. Torre24 involved allegedly
libelous statements about actress Judy Garland reported by
Marie Torre and attributed to a CBS executive.25 Garland sued
CBS and eventually deposed Torre in an effort to identify the
source.2' As is now customary in forced disclosure actions,
Torre refused to reveal the source and was cited with criminal
contempt.27 In an opinion authored by then Judge, and later
Supreme Court Justice, Potter Stewart, the court upheld the
contempt charge, finding that Garland's questions to Torre
went to the heart of the litigation. 2' As a result, the relevance
19. See Carl C. Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for Journalists' Sources: Theory and
Statutory Protection, 51 Mo. L. REV. 1, 18 (1986).
20. See id.
21. See First United Fund Ltd. v. American Banker, Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 489, 494
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (striking an interrogatory that requested disclosure of expense
vouchers, reimbursement expenses, travel logs, diaries, and telephone bills because
of the potential for these records to reveal the identity of a confidential source).
22. See Monk, supra note 19, at 18.
23. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958).
24. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
25. Id. at 547.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 550.
Third-Party Documents
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of the questions outweighed any interest Torre possessed in
refusing to identify her source.2 9 The court recognized, howev-
er, that forced disclosure of confidential sources could have
an impact on the newsgathering process. 3 In doing so, the
court created a balancing test that would eventually become
the constitutional standard.3' Although several subsequent
cases have endorsed the recognition of a First Amendment
privilege, as in Garland, a majority of courts have declined
to grant reporters such a privilege, and inconsistencies remain
in lower court interpretations.32
The Supreme Court issued the next important opinion
concerning the existence of a reporter's privilege almost fifteen
years later in Branzburg v. Hayes.33 In Branzburg, the Court
held that a grand jury may require a reporter to breach an
agreement of confidentiality if the source is alleged to have
witnessed or participated in a crime.34 Nonetheless, the opin-
ion recognized that First Amendment protection may extend
to the newsgathering process. 5
Justice Stewart, dissenting with Justices Brennan and
Marshall, also recognized a qualified privilege. 31 Justice Stew-
art would have applied a three-part test to determine the
applicability of the reporter's privilege.37 To force disclosure
of a confidential source, argued Justice Stewart, the govern-
ment
must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that
the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to
a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that
the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative
means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3)
demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the
information .3
29. Id. at 551.
30. Id. at 548.
31. See Monk, supra note 19, at 18.
32. Mark Neubauer, Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The
Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 UCLA L. REV. 160, 170-71 (1976).
33. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
34. Id. at 708-09.
35. Id. at 681; see also id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell advocated
a qualified privilege entailing a balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
710.
36. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 743.
38. Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus, including Justice Powell's concurrence and the obvious
approval of the privilege by the four dissenting justices," a
majority of the Court did recognize a qualified privilege.
B. Lower Court and State Court Application of Branzburg
Since Branzburg, the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled
on the reporter's privilege. Lower federal courts, however,
have read Branzburg to create a qualified privilege. The First
Circuit employs a balancing approach, judging a reporter's
need for confidentiality against a litigant's need for infor-
mation.4" The Third Circuit has adopted a similar standard,
noting that Branzburg "acknowledged the existence of First
Amendment protection for 'newsgathering"'4 1 and that "[tihe
interrelationship between newsgathering, news dissemination
and the need for a journalist to protect his or her source is too
apparent to require belaboring."42
While Garland and Branzburg established the boundaries
of the reporter's privilege in the federal system, individual
states have adopted a variety of approaches. At least half of
the states have adopted shield laws that lend some protection
to reporters and their confidential sources.43 State shield laws
focus on protecting journalists from compelled disclosure, but
the coverage varies both in statutory construction and in
39. Justice Douglas dissented in a separate opinion advocating an absolute privi-
lege to refuse disclosure of a confidential source. Id. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. See Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595-96 (1st
Cir. 1980).
41. See Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979).
42. Id.
43. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1995); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie 1987); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1070 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (West 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1454 (West 1982); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112
(1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 595.021-.025 (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-902 to -903 (1994); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-21 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (Michie 1987); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2739.12 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1993); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980 & Supp. 1995).
Third-Party Documents
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judicial interpretation."' In those states without a privilege
statute, courts have recognized a qualified privilege arising
from the common law.45 These states commonly use a balanc-
ing test similar to that proposed by Justice Stewart in his
Branzburg dissent.46
C. Application of the Privilege in Defamation Actions
The application of the reporter's privilege can be divided
into three substantive areas. The first of those areas is the
grand jury proceeding. After the Supreme Court's decision in
Branzburg, there is no constitutional protection for journalists
who wish to shield their sources from a grand jury.47 Conse-
quently, reporters must rely on state law for protection.
The second area includes criminal proceedings in which the
defendant seeks to force disclosure of a source. In these cases,
a reporter may have information that would exculpate the
defendant or at least assist in the defense. The courts, using
Justice Stewart's balancing test, will side with the defendant
if the information sought is relevant to a violation of the law,
the information cannot be obtained elsewhere, and the defen-
dant has an overriding interest in the information.48 In these
cases, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compel testi-
mony is especially relevant.49
The third area covers public figure defamation actions,
which are the focus of the remainder of this Note.5 ° Public
44. For a detailed discussion of state shield laws, see Sharon K. Malheiro, Note,
The Journalist's Reportorial Privilege: What Does It Protect and What Are Its Limits?,
38 DRAKE L. REV. 79 (1988-1989).
45. Id. at 93.
46. For an analysis of how state common law privileges have been based on
interpretations of Branzburg in Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, and
New Hampshire, see id. at 93-99.
47. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708-09 (1972).
48. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 966 (1974).
49. See Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
912 (1976); Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
50. The reporter's privilege also may be invoked in non-defamation actions, but
the number of cases in this category is dwarfed by the sheer number of libel cases in
which a reporter is asked to reveal a confidential source. Nonetheless, the protection
available to journalists is great in non-defamation civil actions, because the litigants
often are not in a position to demonstrate a compelling interest in the information
620
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figure libel cases present a tactical problem that is absent
from the analysis in other civil cases because the plaintiff
must offer proof of the publisher's subjective state of mind.
In New York Times v. Sullivan,5' the Supreme Court redefined
a publisher's liability in libel cases involving public officials.
The Court held that a public official must prove that the
publisher acted with actual malice, defined either as known
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.52 Three years later,
the Court extended the actual malice standard to public
figures in general in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 3 Attempt-
ing to give more substance to the standard, the Court next
noted in St. Amant v. Thompson54 that "reckless conduct is
not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing.
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication."55 Providing such evidence may be
difficult, if not impossible, because the defendant may be the
only person capable of giving knowledgeable testimony.
The Court addressed this dilemma in Herbert v. Lando56 by
analyzing the boundaries of discovery in public figure defa-
mation cases.57 Reversing the lower court ruling, the Supreme
Court held that reporters do not have an absolute privilege
to impede discovery into the editorial process.5" The case arose
after CBS reported that Colonel Anthony Herbert, a retired
army officer, lied in claiming that superior officers had
covered up war crimes." During discovery, Herbert's lawyers
deposed Barry Lando, a producer for CBS, to ask Lando about
his state of mind during the editorial process. 0 Herbert
argued that knowledge of the defendant's state of mind was
necessary to prove recklessness under the New York Times
when that interest is weighed against the journalist's First Amendment right in
newsgathering. See Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 383 (N.J. 1982)
(holding that the reporter's privilege is absolute in civil libel action because the
plaintiff has no countervailing constitutional interests at stake).
51. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
52. Id. at 280.
53. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
54. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
55. Id. at 731.
56. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
57. Id. at 165-75; see also Glenchur, supra note 18, at 638.
58. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169.
59. Id. at 156.
60. Id. at 157.
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v. Sullivan standard.6' Lando refused to answer any questions,
asserting his First Amendment privilege to promote uninhibit-
ed editorial discussion in the newsroom. 2 In rejecting Lando's
argument, the Court concluded that an editorial privilege
would limit a plaintiff's ability to prove actual malice.6
The analysis in forced disclosure actions is similar because
of the inherent difficulty in proving actual malice without
knowing the identity of a confidential source. As Judge
Markow suggested in Philip Morris, because a confidential
source may be the only person with alleged firsthand knowl-
edge regarding the truth of a statement, such that the credi-
bility of a report rests with the confidential source, the
identity of the source and what the source did or did not say'
shapes the broadcaster's state of mind.64
To assist plaintiffs, some jurisdictions have forced disclosure
after the plaintiff has created an issue of fact on the remain-
ing elements of the case. 5 In these jurisdictions, a plaintiff
must create a material issue of fact for the jury regarding the
falsity of the alleged libelous statement.66 Finally, a minority
of jurisdictions have adopted a "no-source" presumption.67 In
these jurisdictions, when a reporter refuses to disclose the
identity of a source, the court will presume that the source
does not exist.
8
61. Id. at 156-57.
62. Id. at 171.
63. Id. at 170. For a more detailed discussion of the holding in Herbert, see Gerald
G. Ashdown, Editorial Privilege and Freedom of the Press: Herbert v. Lando in
Perspective, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 303 (1980); Marc A. Franklin, Reflections on Herbert
v. Lando, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1979); Jack H. Friedenthal, Herbert v. Lando: A Note
on Discovery, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1979); James L. Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice
in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655 (1979); Pamela
Paris, Note, Herbert v. Lando: The Supreme Court's Infidelity to New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 374 (1980).
64. Philip Morris (Jan. 26, 1995), supra note 12, at 9.
65. See Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597 (1st
Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726-27 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 104 (1981); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625,
634 (Cal. 1984).
66. E.g., Bruno & Stilman, 633 F.2d at 597.
67. See Robert G. Berger, The "No-Source' Presumption: The Harshest Remedy,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 603, 615-19 (1987) (discussing three cases in which the courts used
the "no-source" presumption).
68. DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp. 880, 887 (D. Haw. 1981); Downing v.
Monitor Publishing Co., 415 A.2d 683, 686 (N.H. 1980).
622
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
FOR A REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
Before examining the impact of third-party discovery in
defamation actions, it is necessary to review the justifications
for the reporter's qualified privilege. "The Supreme Court has
interpreted the first amendment's commitment to a free press
as a constitutional safeguard for the widest dissemination of
information about public issues to an enlightened citizenry
... "' The press plays a central role in the dissemination
process. As Justice Douglas remarked in Branzburg v. Hayes,
"effective self-government cannot succeed unless the people
are immersed in a steady, robust, unimpeded, and uncensored
flow of opinion and reporting which are continuously subjected
to critique, rebuttal, and re-examination. 7 0 At the same time,
the press is seen as the investigative arm of the people,
monitoring all facets of American life. 7 ' Newspaper and
broadcast reporters routinely uncover government corruption,
corporate wrongdoing, and individual vice.72
To continue to provide coverage of newsworthy issues, the
press should be free of governmental restrictions. 3 Recogniz-
ing this principle, the Supreme Court has struck down a
variety of laws that have sought to restrict freedom of the
press.7 4 The Court has overturned legislation enacting prior
restraints on publication,75 limiting press access to court
proceedings, 6 and regulating editorial control.7
Although the Court has not explicitly recognized a First
Amendment right in newsgathering, it has given implicit
69. Glenchur, supra note 18, at 627.
70. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 715 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71. A reporter's task is commonly analogized to that of a watchdog, keeping an
investigative eye on the government. E.g., DANIEL L. BRENNER & WILLIAM L. RIVERS,
FREE BUT REGULATED 77 (1982).
72. Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein's reports on the unfolding Watergate
scandal are a memorable example of how the press can expose non-public information
by promising confidentiality to a news source. See ABC Memorandum, supra note 16,
at 14.
73. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 668 (1970).
74. See Glenchur, supra note 18, at 627.
75. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota ex. rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931).
76. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
77. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 418 U.S. 241. 258 (1974).
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approval of such a right.78 Writing for the majority in Branz-
burg, Justice White noted that the decision was not meant to
suggest that newsgathering does not qualify for First Amend-
ment protection.79 "[W]ithout some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.""°
To facilitate newsgathering, the press must often rely on
information supplied by people closest to or most involved in
an unfolding story. "A reporter is no better than his source
of information." l When sensitive issues arise, sources may
be less willing to volunteer information. By discussing what
others are unwilling to reveal, confidential sources may face
personal risks, such as the loss of a job or exposure to crimi-
nal sanctions. The information that confidential sources
possess is nonetheless the kind in which the public has the
greatest interest. As one journalist quipped, "A lot of big news
stories might never come to light without information from
people who don't want to reveal themselves publicly. So
reporters promise to keep their identities secret, and the next
thing you know you're reading Deep Throat's revelations about
Watergate. It's a very good bargain."82
III. CURRENT LAW ON THIRD-PARTY DISCOVERY
The law on third-party documents as they relate to the
identity of confidential sources is undeveloped.83 Nonethe-
less, courts have considered related questions that may have
some bearing on the third-party document issue. In Report-
ers' Committee for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T,84 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit considered whether media litigants have a First
Amendment interest in third-party documents in the face of
a government investigation. 5 The case arose through the
78. Glenchur, supra note 18, at 627.
79. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 722 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
82. ABCs ofBullying, NEWSDAY, Feb. 11, 1995, at A18.
83. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
84. 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
85. Id. at 1036.
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efforts of journalists who wrote to AT&T seeking assurances
that their toll-billing records would not be released to gov-
ernment investigative agencies without prior notice8 6 Unsat-
isfied with the telephone company's response, the journalists
brought a complaint against AT&T asking for a declaration
that AT&T's policy was unlawful.8 7 The court rejected the
notion that law enforcement officials, must give journalists
notice before issuing subpoenas, because the First Amend-
ment does not immunize information from a good faith
criminal investigation that otherwise adheres to Fourth and
Fifth Amendment protections.8 8
Although the court's decision in Reporter's Committee
speaks to the First Amendment implications of a government
investigation into the identity of a confidential source through
third-party business records, it does not lend any guidance
in the civil context.89 In such cases, several courts have
considered the power of a trial judge to limit discovery to
avoid unnecessary threats to First Amendment rights. In
Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.,S° a manufac-
turer of commercial fishing boats brought a libel action
against a newspaper publisher.9 ' During discovery, the Boston
Globe produced 1500 pages of notes taken by the reporter but
not the notes containing the names of and information from
three sources who had been interviewed with the expectation
that their names would be kept confidential.92 Citing Justice
Powell's opinion in Herbert v. Lando,93 the United States
86. Id. at 1038.
87. Id. at 1036.
88. Id. at 1053. But cf State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982) (holding that the
state constitution protected an individual's privacy interest in his telephone toll
records). The D.C. Circuit's decision in Reporter's Committee envisions the scenario
in which a reporter's contact with a confidential source could be revealed by the
discovery of business records that reflect telephone calls, airline flights, hotel stays,
and taxicab rides. See 593 F.2d at 1048-49. The court's hypothetical bears an
uncanny resemblance to ABC's concern about the private records of Martin and
Bogdanich but in the context of a good faith criminal investigation. See id. With
respect to subpoenas for business records in the course of bad faith criminal investi-
gations, the court acknowledged that a theoretical infringement of First Amendment
rights exists. Id. at 1064.
89. While discussing good faith criminal investigations, Judge Wilkey did suggest,
in dicta, that the First Amendment may give rise to a privacy-type interest in non-
criminal cases. Id. at 1054.
90. 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 584-85.
92. Id. at 585.
93. 441 U.S. 153, 178 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that a district court
has a duty to consider First Amendment interests as well as the private interests of
the plaintiff in public figure libel actions).
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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that courts must
balance the potential harm to the free flow of information
against the need for the requested information. 4 The court,
however, did not address the specific question of first- or
third-party records. Although the documents sought in
discovery had the potential to reveal the identities of the
sources, the documents were notes taken by the reporter, not
records created and held by a third party.95
In Philip Morris Cos. v. American Broadcasting Cos., the
Virginia Circuit Court preliminarily ordered ABC to reveal
the name of Deep Cough, allowing Philip Morris to discover
the identity of the source without searching through third-
party documents.96 Nonetheless, the court cleared the way for
Philip Morris to subpoena documentary and electronically
compiled evidence produced by the reporters' newsgathering
activities. 9v In his decision, Judge Markow emphasized that
this type of third-party discovery must be held to the same
standard that is applied in deciding whether a reporter can
be compelled to disclose the identity of a source.98
IV. THE CHILL OF THIRD-PARTY DISCOVERY
Third-party discovery poses an unmistakable threat to
source confidentiality. If a litigant subpoenas the proper
documents, it can easily discover the identity of a source.99
"The subpoena of third party records in order to trace a re-
porters [sic] movements and thereby identify confidential
sources is tantamount to asking the reporter directly ....
94. Bruno & Stillman, 633 F.2d at 595-96.
95. Id. at 593.
96. Judge Markow preliminarily held that there is a reporter's privilege against
disclosure of confidential sources in public figure defamation cases but found that
Philip Morris had a compelling interest in the identity of Deep Cough that overcame
the privilege. Philip Morris (Jan. 26, 1995), supra note 12, at 13.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 8.
99. For an in-depth hypothetical demonstrating the likelihood that a party will
succeed in its efforts to uncover a source through third-party business records, see
Judge Wilkey's opinion in Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593
F.2d 1030, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979).
100. Philip Morris (Jan. 26, 1995), supra note 12, at 8.
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A. The Philip Morris Decision
Judge Markow recognized the potential harm in allowing
discovery of reporter's documents:
A reporter's promise to maintain confidentiality would be
meaningless if his movements while investigating were
open to scrutiny to glean the identity of his confidential
source.
Further, if the reporter's privilege were subject to this
type of discovery, then why not other privileged relation-
ships, for example, the attorney/client privilege? The court
cringes at the thought of an attorney's credit card records,
telephone billing records, etc., being subject to discovery
in order to determine the identity of his client or the
possible theory of his case to be gleaned from his travels
and the witnesses he contacts. 10 1
Judge Markow further predicted that if Philip Morris were
allowed discovery of third-party records "it would be an open
invitation for every plaintiff in libel suits, not to mention the
potential in other litigation contexts, to make a pro forma
request for this type of discovery whenever a confidential
source is known to exist."0 2 As a result, Judge Markow found
that the permissibility of third-party discovery should be
subject to the same balancing approach applied to forced
disclosure.103
Given his unfavorable depiction of third-party discovery,
Judge Markow's preliminary order denying ABC's motion to
quash the subpoenas duces tecum °4 is difficult to understand.
Judge Markow apparently gleaned a compelling interest
based on Philip Morris' inability to prove actual malice with-
out knowledge of Deep Cough's identity. The analysis of the
court, however, focused on forced disclosure without specifi-
cally judging the relevance, availability of information, and
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 13.
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compelling nature of the evidence in relation to third-party
discovery,"' as suggested by the Supreme Court.1°6
B. Arguments in Support of Philip Morris
Opponents of a reporter's privilege to shield third-party
documents could raise several arguments to support Judge
Markow's preliminary opinion. First, the ability of a libel
plaintiff to track down a confidential source may not be a
valid concern because many courts eventually will force the
reporter to reveal the source.
10 7
Second, libel plaintiffs may have a legitimate interest in
third-party documents that is unrelated to the identification
of a confidential source. Under the liberal federal discovery
rules, for example, a private litigant may have discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action, ...
including the existence, description, nature, custody, con-
dition, and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. 08
Furthermore, a litigant may not object to a discovery request
on the grounds that the information sought will be inadmissi-
ble at trial if the information appears "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."'0 9 Records of
phone calls, meals, and hotel stays (or the absence thereof)
may go directly to the issue of whether a reporter has investi-
gated a story with an eye toward satisfying the actual malice
standard. For example, if a libel plaintiff can demonstrate
that the defendant published a defamatory statement with
"armchair" knowledge without engaging in any outside inves-
tigation, a jury could find that the defendant acted with a
reckless disregard for the truth.
105. Id. at 12.
106. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 US. 665, 700-01 (1972).
107. For a summary of federal and state court approaches to forced disclosure, see
supra notes Part I.




Third, discovery of third-party documents may be required
by the test suggested in Justice Stewart's Branzburg dis-
sent." 0 Under that test, libel plaintiffs must demonstrate that
the information they seek cannot be obtained by alternative
means which are less destructive of First Amendment
rights."' Under this test, third-party discovery may be less
destructive of First Amendment rights than forced disclosure.
C. Justifications for Expanding the Reporter's
Qualified Privilege to Third-Party Records
Although the arguments outlined above deserve consider-
ation, the counterarguments are more compelling because
they form the foundation for an expansion of the reporter's
privilege to third-party discovery. First, in many libel cases,
the court will force the reporter to disclose a confidential
source once the plaintiff creates an issue of material fact on
the truth or falsity of the alleged defamatory statement."
2
When courts force disclosure in this manner, the rationale for
allowing third-party discovery disappears. Once the identity
of the confidential source is known, the plaintiff's interest in
the documents correspondingly becomes suspect. Whatever
plaintiffs had hoped to learn on the issue of actual malice,
they now can learn directly from the confidential source.
Second, plaintiffs who cannot demonstrate a compelling
interest in discovering the identity of a confidential source
often will be unable to demonstrate an independent reason
to justify discovery of third-party records. In the wake of
Philip Morris, reporters, dubious of the intent of libel plain-
tiffs in their efforts to obtain third-party records," 3 view the
tobacco company's strategy as nothing less than an effort to
silence its detractors."" Indeed, before settling the case with
110. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 US. 665, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
113. See Martin Schram, Smoking Out the Destroyers of Rights, NEWSDAY, Nov.
30, 1994, at A37 ("Philip Morris has carefully aimed its smoking-gun subpoenas to
strike at all Americans: Those of us who don't like crooked dealings we see in our daily
life and want to do something about it, and those of us who like living in a democracy
and depend upon a free flow of information to make our election-day decisions.").
114. See ABCs of Bullying, supra note 82, at A18. An unsigned editorial in News-
day suggests that as a result of the ruling in the Philip Morris case, "whistle-blowers
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ABC, Philip Morris had an incentive to learn the names of all
persons in the tobacco industry, specifically those working at
Philip Morris, who spoke with Day One reporters. Had the
case proceeded to trial, Philip Morris could have used this
information to intimidate the employees into giving favorable
testimony.
Finally, third-party documents may further threaten the
newsgathering process by silencing journalists. As one news-
paper editorial argued, Philip Morris' discovery demands look
"like an attempt to harass ABC and intimidate journalists
elsewhere."" 5 Some reporters do not seem to recognize the
silencing effect that third-party discovery could have on their
own reporting techniques." 6 If a court endorses discovery of
credit card and telephone records, it will be granting libel
plaintiffs access to the reporter's private activities. The re-
cords may reveal embarrassing or even illegal facets of a
reporter's life.
Knowing that a future libel plaintiff might seek their pri-
vate records, reporters are less likely to pursue controversial
stories. Their concern could shift from protecting confidential
sources to protecting themselves by choosing those stories
that are least likely to invite a libel suit, regardless of the
validity or usefulness of the story to the public.
Despite his decision concerning the business records of
Martin and Bogdanich, Judge Markow predicted that third-
party discovery "will deter sources from divulging information
and deter reporters from gathering and publishing infor-
everywhere will be reluctant to rely on reporters' assurances of confidentiality." Id.
A recent decision by CBS executives to cancel a 60 Minutes story by Mike Wallace
involving an interview with Jeffrey Wigand, a former executive of the Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation, because of the threat of litigation indicates that the
tobacco industry's tactics are working. See Frank Rich, Fear and Favor, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1995, at A23. CBS eventually aired the story, but only after the substance
of Wigand's interview already had been disclosed as part of his deposition in a
separate lawsuit between Wigand and Brown & Williamson. Bill Carter, CBS
Broadcasts Interview with Tobacco Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at B8.
115. ABCs of Bullying, supra note 82, at A18.
116. See Schram, supra note 113, at A37. Martin Schram identifies those people
who will be harmed by Judge Markow's decision regarding third-party discovery. Id.
He includes any person who had contact with an ABC reporter, anyone who may have
spoken on the telephone with anyone calling from the home of an ABC reporter, and
any person in the future who chooses to confide in a reporter. Id. Noticeably missing
from his list are the reporters themselves. For a discussion on the impact of Philip
Morris' legal tactics on investigative reporting, see Reliable Sources (CNN television
broadcast, Nov. 27, 1994) (transcript at 3-4, on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
mation."117 One commentator has noted that a favorable deci-
sion for libel plaintiffs in the Philip Morris case "would
become precedent used by all who have desperate reason to
muffle, muzzle, and mute potential future whistle-blowers."18
But who are the whistle-blowers: the confidential sources who
are more likely to be uncovered or the journalists seeking out
the confidential sources? One might presume that the refer-
ence is to the former, but the observation is equally true of
investigative journalists."9
The similarities between the reporter's qualified privilege
to protect a confidential source and the proposed expansion
of the privilege to third-party discovery becomes more obvious
if one traces the policy behind the privilege. The purpose of
the qualified privilege to protect confidential sources is to
foster the newsgathering process. 20 Were it not for our inter-
est in promoting zealous newsgathering through the First
Amendment, the law would care little for informants who
wished to maintain their anonymity.
V. A TEST FOR THE APPLICATION
OF AN EXPANDED PRIVILEGE
Because freedom of the press depends on journalists' abili-
ties to obtain information, courts should recognize a right to
deny discovery of third-party records that threaten to reveal
information regarding the private lives of reporters. If society
intends to foster the newsgathering process, the judicial
system must provide more protection for a reporter's private
documents than the Virginia Circuit Court provided in Philip
Morris.
Judge Markow held in Philip Morris that third-party dis-
covery requests are subject to the same limitations imposed
117. Philip Morris (Jan. 26, 1995), supra note 12, at 7.
118. See Schram, supra note 113, at A37.
119. See Reliable Sources, supra note 116 (transcript at 4). The suggestion by
commentators that reporters, like public figures, assume the risks of exposing their
private lives to public scrutiny by participating in investigative journalism is un-
persuasive because the public has a First Amendment interest in investigative
reporting that is greater than a libel plaintiff's interest in a reporter's business
records.
120. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
910 (1958).
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on plaintiffs who attempt to force disclosure of a confidential
source. 121 Courts must do more to protect the newsgathering
process. At the same time, plaintiffs must be given an ade-
quate opportunity to subpoena documents which would other-
wise be discoverable. The goal should be to shape discovery
to allow plaintiffs to obtain relevant documents and to protect
journalists from undue harassment.
With these objectives in mind, a court hearing a libel action
involving a public figure should order third-party discovery
requests of a reporter's private records only when: (1) the
information sought is relevant to proving a disputed issue at
trial; (2) the information sought cannot be obtained by alter-
native means, including forced disclosure; (3) the plaintiff
demonstrates a compelling and overriding interest in the
information; and (4) the plaintiff's interest in the information
is based on a good faith belief that the information sought
will lead to admissible evidence other than the identity of a
confidential source. 122 The plaintiff should carry the burden
of persuasion on these four elements of the test. If the plain-
tiff can meet this burden, the defendant then should be
permitted to show that the plaintiff's reasons are only pretext
for harassing a confidential source or investigative journalist.
This approach would cure several problems presented by
Judge Markow's analysis. First, plaintiffs like Philip Morris
would not be allowed to fish for additional information once
they have learned the identity of a source. Admittedly, it is
impossible to predict all the purposes for which future libel
plaintiffs will seek to use third-party discovery. In Philip
Morris, however, the intention of the plaintiff to discover the
name of Day One's confidential source was obvious. 2 Thus,
once Judge Markow ordered disclosure, there was no relevant
information to be discovered by searching through the re-
porters' phone and travel records. The second element of the
proposed test would prevent future libel plaintiffs from pur-
suing both strategies because the test requires that plaintiffs
seek forced disclosure first. Given the similarity between the
121. Philip Morris (Jan. 26, 1995), supra note 12, at 8.
122. The Second Circuit suggested a similar approach 13 years before the Supreme
Court's decision in Branzburg, commenting that courts should consider whether
discovery is being requested "in good faith and not in such manner as to unreasonably
annoy, embarrass or oppress the witness." See Garland, 259 F.2d at 551.
123. See ABC Memorandum, supra note 16, at 16.
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proposed test and the general test for forced disclosure, if a
plaintiff cannot compel disclosure, third-party discovery as a
means of discovering the identity of a confidential source also
will be denied. This conclusion does not mean, however, that
a libel plaintiff may not seek third-party discovery on some
other issue.
Second, the proposed test provides protection against un-
necessary harassment since a defendant may challenge the
intent of third-party discovery. The burden will fall on the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the suggested rationale for
seeking a reporter's private telephone and travel records is
not pretext for some other purpose. Plaintiffs are in the best
position to carry this burden because only they may make an
affirmative showing of proper intent. For example, a plaintiff
might be entitled to discovery upon a showing to the court
that third-party records have the potential to yield relevant
information in which the plaintiff has a compelling interest.
Upon a showing of pretext by the defendant and a rebuttal
by the plaintiff, a judge then may decide whether a plaintiff
has a legitimate interest in third-party records or whether the
discovery is merely intended to harass the defendant. When
faced with a tough case, a judge could inspect the records in
camera, deleting information irrelevant to the case that would
tend to embarrass a reporter.
These extra levels of protection would minimize the impact
of third-party discovery on the newsgathering process. The
identity of sources would remain confidential when the plain-
tiff fails to meet the requirements of a forced disclosure ac-
tion, and third-party discovery of a reporter's private records
would not be used as an alternative means for determining
the identity of a source. Thus, reporters would be able to
engage in investigative journalism without the fear that
discovery in a libel suit will reveal the details of their private
lives.
CONCLUSION
The Philip Morris case has created a new avenue of attack
on the First Amendment and investigative journalism. The
Virginia Circuit Court's preliminary decision sent a message
to libel plaintiffs that aggressive third-party discovery of
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reporters' private documents is an effective method of deter-
ring future whistle-blowers from telling their story.
Without promises of confidentiality, journalists would lose
the ability to interview people who otherwise would remain
silent. For this reason, American courts have sought to pro-
tect the newsgathering process by recognizing a reporter's
qualified privilege to shield the identity of a confidential
source. Allowing unlimited discovery of third-party records
gives libel plaintiffs a method to overcome this judicially-
created obstacle. Moreover, this type of discovery threatens
to reveal private information that could eliminate a journal-
ist's incentive to pursue newsworthy investigations.
The proposed test for third-party discovery offers a different
perspective for courts that will consider the issue in years to
come. If society wishes to protect the values inherent in the
First Amendment, litigants and judges alike should consider
the merits of this proposal.
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